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“Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.” Dwight D. Eisenhower’s remarks at a conference on National
Defense in 1957 reflected the philosophy behind his national security system: his dedication to preparation
and proper planning. One of Eisenhower’s most regularly used, structured tools for proper planning was the
National Security Council (NSC). The Council was an organization comprised of high-ranking members of
government, chaired by the president, which was designed to provide the president with the information and
coordination needed to shape intelligent policy. The Council itself was not created by Eisenhower, but was
part of the National Security Act of 1947, along with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. The Council’s stated goal was “to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for
the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security.” The National
Security Act was flexible; it provided presidents with great discretion in operating the council. Eisenhower
crafted the NSC for his needs. In the words of Eisenhower’s first Special Assistant for National Security,
Robert Cutler, “Eisenhower wished the council mechanism made over into a valuable tool for his constant
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Dwight D. Eisenhower, The National Security Council, 
 and Dien Bien Phu 
 
DAVID PUTNAM HADLEY 
Gettysburg College 
 
 “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.”1 Dwight D. Eisenhower’s remarks at a 
conference on National Defense in 1957 reflected the philosophy behind his national security 
system: his dedication to preparation and proper planning. One of Eisenhower’s most regularly 
used, structured tools for proper planning was the National Security Council (NSC). The Council 
was an organization comprised of high-ranking members of government, chaired by the 
president, which was designed to provide the president with the information and coordination 
needed to shape intelligent policy.  The Council itself was not created by Eisenhower, but was 
part of the National Security Act of 1947, along with the Central Intelligence Agency and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff.2 The Council’s stated goal was “to provide for the establishment of 
integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the 
Government relating to the national security.”3 The National Security Act was flexible; it 
provided presidents with great discretion in operating the council.4 Eisenhower crafted the NSC 
for his needs. In the words of Eisenhower’s first Special Assistant for National Security, Robert 
                                                            
1 Dwight D. Eisenhower Remarks at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference, 14 November 
1957, Public Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower 1957, 817-820, Quotation courtesy of Daniel Holt. 
2 Phillip Henderson, Managing the Presidency: The Eisenhower Legacy- From Kennedy to Reagan 
(Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), 71-72. 
3 National Security Act of 1947, Section 2, in Henry M. Jackson, ed., The National Security Council: 
Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy Making at the Presidential Level (New York, Washington, and London: 
Frederick A. Praeger, publishers, 1965), 295. 
4 Section 101(D) states that: “The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such 
other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require,” in ibid., 298. 
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Cutler, “Eisenhower wished the council mechanism made over into a valuable tool for his 
constant use.”5 
 Beginning with Fred Greenstein’s seminal The Hidden-Hand Presidency, which studied 
Eisenhower’s leadership with a more critical eye, Eisenhower and his approach to governance 
have been reappraised. The NSC is a key example.6 Prior to the advent of Eisenhower 
revisionism, Eisenhower’s NSC was often criticized, beginning with a Congressional 
Commission initiated by Senator Henry Jackson in 1959.7 This study criticized the NSC for 
being too complex, a paper mill filled with vast numbers of pages of planning, all of which were, 
in the Jackson committee’s view, compromised to the point of uselessness by ironing out 
disagreement. Another major complaint was that the policy papers were useless in emergency 
situations, as the Planning Board took too long to study and prepare them.8 The NSC was seen as 
being far too structured to deal with rapidly developing, changing threats. In his presidential 
campaign in 1960, John F. Kennedy used this report to attack the “paper mill” of the NSC; he 
explained in a letter to Jackson that he wanted to “simplify the operations of the national security 
council.”9 The NSC’s bureaucratic nature was also attacked for preventing proper 
communication and cooperation among various departments. It was said that department 
representatives were isolated in a group where there was no effective back-and-forth but rather 
“agreement by exhaustion.” Eisenhower was also accused of using the NSC apparatus to deflect 
                                                            
5 Robert Cutler, No Time for Rest (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, and Company, 1965), 295. 
6 Greenstein’s Hidden Hand Presidency does not deal with the NSC as such, but his work How Presidents 
Test Reality, coauthored with John Burke, goes deeper into National Security decisions. Phillip Henderson’s 
Managing the Presidency provides both background and contextual studies of Eisenhower’s NSC and the use he put 
it to. Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman’s Waging Peace offers a very good account of National Security 
operating policies. Bowie himself was a representative of the State Department on the Policy Planning Board of the 
NSC from 1953-1957. 
7 Henry M. Jackson, introduction to The National Security Council, x. 
8 Jackson, The National Security Council, 8. 
9 David J. Rothkopf, Running the World The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the 
Architects of American Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 79; Kennedy quote from Jackson, introduction to 
The National Security Council, xiii. 
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criticism from himself.10 It is important to note, though, that these criticisms mainly came from 
people outside the system. Those on the inside stress that Eisenhower was the ultimate decider of 
issues, who demanded the representation of alternate points of view. Cutler explained that the 
Council was, for Eisenhower, “a vital mechanism to assure that all sides of an issue would be 
known by him before coming to his decision.”11 Cutler stressed that “the Council’s role is 
advisory. It makes recommendations to its statutory chairman, the President of the United States; 
it does not decide.”12 
 The issue raised by these opposing viewpoints on the Council ultimately focused upon 
this question: was the NSC capable of flexibility, or was it a repressive organization that 
squashed debate? It appeared upon reappraisal that despite the NSC’s formal structure, it allowed 
a great deal of flexibility. The NSC provided a forum for multiple voices and multiple options, 
giving not only advice to the president, but enabling participants to know the president’s and 
each other’s viewpoints.13 Eisenhower did not envision the NSC as his only source of 
information or advice. Throughout his presidency, Eisenhower would establish such committees 
or groups as he felt necessary to handle a particular problem.  These groups were independent of 
the NSC, but were capable of acting in cooperation, such as the Solarium Project which led to 
the “New Look” in national security policy. Eisenhower would also regularly engage in informal 
meetings with his subordinates, supplementing the formal procedures of his national security 
mechanisms. He used these informal means to such an extent that some scholars have even 
suggested that the NSC became essentially a façade during Eisenhower’s time in the White 
                                                            
10 Stanley L. Falk, “The NSC Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy,” Political Science Quarterly, 79 
(September 1964): 403-434; reprint in Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson, eds., Fateful Decisions: Inside the 
National Security Council (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 43 (page citations are to reprint 
edition. Portion dealing with Kennedy is omitted); Henderson, Managing the Presidency, 71. 
11 Cutler, No Time For Rest, 366. 
12 Ibid., 295.  
13 Henderson, Managing the Presidency, 81. 
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House. Amy Zegart, of UCLA, notes that “Eisenhower made organizational choices that gave 
public preeminence to Cabinet-centered policy making [including forums such as the NSC] but 
also worked behind the scenes to presidentialize, personalize, and centralize the system,” 
suggesting that the token use of the NSC that would occur under Kennedy started with 
Eisenhower. 14 However, these informal means were used in conjunction with the NSC, not at 
the expense of the NSC. Creating an informal apparatus did not, simply by existing, undercut t
importance of the Council to presidential decision-making. The National Security Council of 
Dwight D. Eisenhower was designed to provide the president with the best advice available, and 
therefore exercised an influential role in the Eisenhower White House. The discussions in the 
Council and the recommendations made, however, were part of a larger structure mixing formal 
and informal processes in determining national security policy.  
he 
                                                           
 Perhaps the best way to understand the NSC and Eisenhower’s use of it in conjunction 
with other avenues of advice is in specific examples. An especially important and relevant one is 
the decision that faced the Council in March and April of 1954, concerning the besieged French 
forces at Dien Bien Phu in Indochina. France’s war in Indochina was a situation Eisenhower had 
inherited from the Truman administration. The ultimate decision not to intervene, but to continue 
supporting elements in Vietnam and the other Indochinese states, would affect the U.S. for years 
to come. The decision came at a relatively early period in Eisenhower’s presidency, when the 
operation of the NSC and its machinery were relatively new since the various members were 
settling into their roles. Examination of the decisions regarding Dien Bien Phu thus provides 
insight into the eternal questions of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. It also illuminates the early, 
formative stages of a body which played a key role in policy during the Eisenhower 
 
14 Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), 83. 
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administration years and how that body acted in concert with other elements of Eisenhower’s 
leadership. 
Part I 
 Before grappling with a specific case, it is best to examine what Eisenhower’s NSC was 
intended to be, and who had a hand in making it that way. First, how was the Eisenhower NSC 
impacted by the prior administration? The first suggestions of an organization like the NSC 
appear in a report in 1945 to the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, from Ferdinand 
Eberstadt, a policy advisor working in the War Production Board. In the letter Eberstadt 
discusses, among other things, the need for a coordinating body. This suggestion would 
eventually gestate into the NSC in 1947. Under the Truman administration, the NSC was used on 
an occasional basis.15 Truman participated sporadically in the Council after its inception, 
attending eleven of the almost sixty meetings held before the outbreak of the Korean War. 
Initially, meetings were held every two weeks, but became more uneven as time went by. The 
Council also increased in size. Though Truman began to use the Council apparatus more once 
the Korean War broke out, it retained its role of being an adjutant to proceedings, rather than a 
place where policy was formulated.16 The NSC at this time lacked its own formal staff, but it did 
form an ancillary body in the Psychological Coordinating Board, to separate and discuss the 
large numbers of psychological operations proposed to be carried out against Cold War targets. 
Proposed in December of 1947, it began producing papers in September of 1948.17 When 
evaluating the Council, Eisenhower and his subordinates recognized some useful ideas. As 
                                                            
15 Douglas Kinnard, “President Eisenhower and the Defense Budget,” Journal of Politics 39, no.3 (August, 
1977), 599. Academic Search Premier. Accessed 6 December 2008. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?Direct=true& db=aph&AN=4816322&site=ehost-live. 
16 Rothkopf, 57-60. For a more in-depth, yet relatively brief, account of Truman’s NSC, see John Prados, 
Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush (New York: William Morrow 
and Company, 1991), 27-56. 
17 Prados, Keepers of the Keys, 51. 
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Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman noted in their study of Eisenhower’s system, “Eisenhower 
intended to modify and improve upon Truman’s foundation, not obliterate it.”18  
 The Eisenhower National Security Council came from Eisenhower’s respect for the need 
of reliable intelligence and reliable processing of that intelligence in decision-making. As one 
NSC member explained, “An integral and in fact basic element in the formation of national 
security policy is the latest and best intelligence bearing on the substance of the policy to be 
determined.”19 Once the Eisenhower administration entered the White House, the Council took 
steps that resulted in the adoption of “uniform and customary procedure,” in which there were 
two to three hour meetings held most frequently on Thursday, with formal planning papers 
discussed; each of which had a financial appendices for any policy costs, an opening CIA brief 
given by CIA Director Allen Dulles, and minimum attendance for vigorous discussion.20 The 
National Security Act of 1947 put fixed membership at the President, the Vice-President, the 
Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense.21 Eisenhower added the Director of the Office 
of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and regularly invited the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Budget Director. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the CIA Director were also present as 
advisors, as were any officials who were needed for a particular order of business, such as the 
Attorney General or the Chairman of the Atomic energy commission.22 At the heart of this 
grouping was Eisenhower’s desire for information to be more available; he wanted the 
                                                            
18 Richard H. Immerman and Robert R. Bowie, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold 
War Strategy (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 73. Bowie, it should be noted, was with the 
State Department during the time this paper is concerned with. As such, he appears as both an author and 
participant. 
19 Robert Cutler, Intelligence as a Foundation for Policy, 59, in Andrew J. Goodpaster Collection, Box 15, 
Folder 16, George Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Virginia. 
20 Cutler, No Time For Rest, 296-299. 
21 Rothfokp, Running the World, 4. 
22 Falk, “The NSC Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy,” 41. 
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information at his disposal and at the disposal of the people most directly related to carrying out 
national security.  
The Eisenhower NSC did away with the Psychological Operations Board, and created 
two ancillary organizations, the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board.  Also 
new was the position of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. The assistant determined 
the Council’s agenda, briefed the President, and supervised the operations of the Council and 
NSC staff, and coordinated the various people and departments involved. All the people involved 
in the NSC were, by Eisenhower’s logic, expanding their own knowledge and ability, and not 
just informing him. Eisenhower, “always insisted that government cannot function properly if 
anybody who’s in an important position is confined merely to his own . . . particular field of 
interest.”23 The agenda of the Council was determined by the Special Assistant. 
 Important for any understanding of Eisenhower’s NSC is his first Special Assistant for 
National Security, Robert Cutler, a banker from Boston who worked as a staff officer in World 
War II. According to Cutler’s successor, a Texas lawyer and businessman named Dillon 
Anderson, “The President’s concept of the National Security Council and the use he wanted to 
make of it was the work of Robert Cutler.”24 In an article published during Cutler’s tenure as 
special assistant, he was described by the qualities most apparently visible about him: an affable 
good nature and a sense of humor. However, insiders knew that he was, “a key figure in . . . the 
transforming of the National Security Council into the most important policy-making agency this 
                                                            
23 Dwight D. Eisenhower, interview with Philip A. Crowl (Gettysburg, PA, 28 July 1964) for John Foster 
Dulles Oral History Project (Princeton University Library, Princeton, NJ: Wilmington Scholarly Resources, 1994), 
microfilm, reel 4, 13-14. 
24 Dillon Anderson, interview with James Luter (Houston, 30-31 December 1969), 16, in Archive of Letters 
and Papers Relating to Dillon Anderson and his Long-Term Relationship with Eisenhower, Box 4, Folder 14, 
Special Collections, Musselman Library, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, PA.  
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country has ever known.”25 Though erring in regards to the NSC as being a policy making 
agency, the magazine does properly describe Cutler’s importance in setting the Council’s agenda 
and his general unobtrusiveness in performing that role and remaining a neutral figure. “[Cutler 
is] extremely aware that his effectiveness depends upon suppressing any urge for personal power 
and remaining in the background.”26 Cutler himself would explain later that, “My job was to 
administer, to serve, to get things done, to be trusted,” but he had, “no independent status,” as he 
acted for the president in organizing the NSC and managing the various policymakers’ opinions 
without betraying his own personal thoughts.27 Cutler was to provide the essential staff work. 
Eisenhower, as Cutler noted, “was accustomed to good staff work.”28 Cutler knew well what his 
role was, as he had been instrumental in determining how the NSC would run at the beginning of 
Eisenhower’s administration. 
 In a meeting at the Commodore Hotel with his transition team on January 12 and 13, 
1953, Eisenhower focused on national security as a key issue. At this meeting, Eisenhower 
announced Cutler as the Special Assistant for National Security and the point man in adjusting 
the NSC for Eisenhower’s purposes. Cutler had served as Eisenhower’s NSC expert during the 
campaign, as he had previously worked on the Psychological Study Board as its deputy and had 
been the assistant to James Forrestal while the latter had been the Secretary of Defense.29 Cutler 
began a sweeping look at Council operating procedures, meeting with, among others, George 
Marshall, Ferdinand Eberhardt, and the NSC Executive Secretary James Lay, who would be 
                                                            
25 Samuel Lubell, “Mystery Man of the White House,” Saturday Evening Post, 2 June 1954, vol. 226, 32, 
p.27. Academic Search Premier. Accessed 6 December 2008. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db= aph&AN=19380304&site=ehost-live. 
26 Ibid., 79. 
27 Cutler, No Time For Rest, 315. 
28 Ibid., 300. 
29 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 85-86. 
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asked to stay on.30 Based on the advice he received, especially from George Marshall, Cutler 
resolved that policy papers should clearly spell out alternatives and include disagreements among 
staffers, that the NSC would need a full time senior staff, that there should be a presidential 
presence whenever possible, and there needed to be a member of the White House to run herd on 
the various departments, which would be his role as Special Assistant.31 With these ideas in 
mind, Cutler would oversee the creation of the Planning Board and the Operations Control 
Board. 
 The Planning Board would play a vital role in the operation of the Council, as it was the 
place of the preparatory work. What would be discussed at Council meetings was determined by 
the Planning Board. As they drafted policy papers, they were not expected to iron over their 
disagreements, but rather include dissenting opinions in the paper to the Council.32 In attendance 
would be Cutler as chairperson, a CIA deputy director, a representative of the Joint Chiefs, and 
whatever representatives of whichever department had interest or expertise pertaining to a 
specific issue.33 The Joint Chiefs’ representative was in a curious position. Cutler explained that, 
“The Chiefs . . . are like the College of Cardinals. They are a different body than anything else in 
the world.” He continued that, as a matter of protocol, “[They] cannot formally give an opinion 
on a paper until the paper is in final, formal form and has been circulated to the members. We 
often know very clearly . . . how the Chiefs will react . . . but we do not get it in writing until 
they see the paper has been sent to the Council members.”34 Despite any protocol or 
                                                            
30 Rothkopf, Running the World, 66. 
31 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 86-88. 
32 Thomas Preston, The President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in 
Foreign Affairs (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 68. 
33 Culter, Intelligence as Foundation for Policy, 67; Henderson, Managing the Presidency 77. 
34 Robert Cutler, “Selected Testimony: The National Security under President Eisenhower,” in Jackson, The 
National Security Council, 115. While Cutler does not explain why this is the case in his testimony, rather 
presenting it as a fact of life, it would be sensible as a means of obtaining a variety of opinion. If the Joint Chiefs 
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departmental difficulties, all those who attended were described by Cutler as being “highly 
qualified” representatives who had direct access to the head of whichever agency or department 
they represented.35 This was a change from previous practice, where without the Planning Board, 
the Council members themselves advocated policies. Eisenhower explained that, “You council 
members . . . simply do not have enough time to do what needs to be done in thinking out the 
best decisions regarding the national security . . . Someone must therefore do much of this 
thinking  for you.36” In addition to the Planning Board’s effect on the Council members 
themselves, it also provided interaction for the different department members. Cutler explained 
that, “More important than what is planned is that the planners become accustomed to working 
together on hard problems, enabling them . . . to arrive more surely at a reasonable plan of 
policy.”37  
The plans formulated by the Planning Board would go up what would be described as 
“Policy Hill,” with Eisenhower and the NSC at the top, where the proposals were discussed, 
modified, or combined.38 These papers required advanced planning, with typically two or three 
sessions used to work up a draft.39 The Planning Board met with greater frequency than did the 
NSC proper; rather than one meeting a week, they met three times a week during Eisenhower’s 
first term and two times a week in the second. Cutler explained that for his first three-and-a-half 
year stint, he was the chair of some 504 Planning Board sessions.40 This process was geared 
more toward long-range policy planning. Taking such time to iron out policy statements could be 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
gave their opinion before the final draft was created, it could impact the ultimate independent conclusions upon 
which the Chiefs would comment later. 
35 Cutler, No Time For Rest, 296 
36 Memorandum of Discussion at 137th Meeting of the NSC, 19 March 1953, NSC Series, Dwight D 
Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 
Abilene, Kansas, in Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 91. 
37 Cutler, No Time for Rest, 297. 
38 Prados, Keepers of the Keys, 63. 
39 Cutler, No Time for Rest, 307. 
40 Ibid., 312-313. 
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cumbersome. However, the Planning Board did have the ability to work intensively when 
needed. According to Cutler, for an unidentified Asian crisis, the Planning Board met three 
successive days, working a total of twenty-five hours to come up with a new draft.41 After 
chairing the Board and coordinating the process, Cutler would then be charged with the duty of 
presenting the papers to the council and emphasizing any splits that had occurred during the 
drafting process.42 
 With the Planning Board controlling input into the Council, the Operations Control Board 
handled the results of Council meetings. It was formed September 2, 1953, both to coordinate the 
activities of the departments involved in NSC decisions and to report on any progress. It replaced 
the old Psychological Operations Board, to provide coordination for more than just 
psychological operations.43 While a statutory body, it was not officially part of the NSC system 
until an executive order February 25, 1957. Though it had formal meetings, most of the business 
was conducted over luncheons with representatives of the various agencies involved. It was a 
curious mix of formal and informal arrangements. It never quite lived up to what Eisenhower and 
Cutler hoped it would be, and was continuously adjusted throughout the administration. The 
Planning Board and OCB were both supplemented by the NSC support staff, was not made up of 
appointees but rather career individuals who helped preserve what historian Phillip Henderson, 
in his study of Eisenhower’s leadership, identified as “institutional memory,” the maintenance of 
continuity among various administrations. In explaining how the council worked, Cutler 
identified the ideal way in which these bodies interacted to advise the president. For example, 
                                                            
41 Ibid., 312. Unfortunately, Cutler did not disclose many details in his memoir about actual NSC meetings 
or situations. Identifying the situation he referred to as being in Southeast Asia sometime during the Eisenhower 
administration is as specific as he ever is. It is possible that he refers to Dien Bien Phu, as it was the most significant 
South Asian event during his first term as Special Assistant. However, there is no way to say for certain. 
42 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 93. 
43 Henderson, Managing the Presidency, 86-88. Prados notes that the lunches saw the most secret business, 
as no minutes or formal records were kept of the proceedings, Keepers of the Keys, 73.  
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discussions in regards to circumstances in a theoretical country Cutler called “Ruritania” would 
be scheduled months in advance of the NSC meeting addressing the problem. There would be 
three to five sessions devoted to that item, with factual and analytical statements prepared. A 
draft would be written, torn apart, and continuously rewritten. Cutler explained that they sought 
agreement on the correctness of facts, while there would be divergent opinions in analysis. The 
Council members would receive the Planning Board document ten days ahead of time, and the 
Joint Chiefs would be asked their opinions.44 This process reinforced the fact that the NSC 
machinery worked best in terms of long-range planning on situations that would be fairly static; 
it was not a perfect system. Cutler himself acknowledged this: “it is certainly true that human 
beings are fallible and that the instruments which they create are always susceptible of 
improvement. The mechanism which I have described, and is in operation, can and will be 
improved as time goes one.”45 
 While Robert Cutler reformed and refined the machinery of the National Security 
Council, it was accepted and implemented because it reflected how Eisenhower felt about proper 
advisory systems. “There was no doubt,” Dillon Anderson explained, “who was running the 
show.”46 Eisenhower’s influence could be seen in the orderly, formal structures of the system. 
“No American president believed more strongly in an orderly system for strategic planning and 
policy making, and that a well-conceived organization was essential for such a system.”47 Many 
noted that no president came into the White House with more experience in efficiently running 
large bureaucratic bodies than Dwight D. Eisenhower. “Eisenhower knew how to run a staff and 
                                                            
44 Cutler, Intelligence as Foundation for Policy, 68-71. 
45 Ibid., 71. 
46 Dillon Anderson, interview with Richard D. Challenger (Houston, TX, 13 June 1966)in John Foster 
Dulles Oral History Project (Princeton University Library, Princeton, NJ: Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1994), 
microfilm reel 1, 17. 
47 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace,83. 
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make it work to his liking.”48 Phillip Henderson, however, made a key distinction that the 
National Security Council was not organized along precisely military lines.49 The key was that 
Eisenhower learned the value of organization and how to work with subordinates during his 
years with the military, but this did not translate directly to the civilian world. He recognized that 
his cabinet and staff were mostly civilians. He set up clear lines of authority on staff matters to 
be sure, but was not rigid in methods of receiving advice. Thomas Preston, in his study of 
presidential leadership methods, noted that “although characterized by elaborate formal 
structures, Eisenhower’s advisory system incorporated an unusual mix of formal and informal 
channels of advice.”50 From his experience with the politics of high command, he was more than 
able to use his informal channels with statesmen as well as soldiers. 
 The person he most communicated with in both formal and informal settings was John 
Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State. The President’s Staff Secretary, General Andy Goodpaster, 
reported that Eisenhower told him that, “[he] knew the inside of Foster Dulles’ mind the way he 
knew the inside of his own mind.”51 Eisenhower himself reported that he would sometimes talk 
to Dulles as many as eight to ten times a day on the phone, depending upon what was happening 
in the world, and at the end of the day Eisenhower and Dulles would occasionally meet for 
drinks and discuss business and personal subjects.52 However, it was not only Dulles who had 
the ability to communicate so directly with the President. Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, Sherman 
Adams, reported that Eisenhower had a policy of being open to any “reasonable” member of the 
                                                            
48 Rothkopf, Running the World, 65. 
49 Henderson, Managing the Presidency, 17-21. 
50 Preston, The President and His Inner Circle, 67. 
51 Andrew Goodpaster, interview with Richard D. Challenger (Washington, DC, 11 January 1966), in John 
Foster Dulles Oral History Project (Princeton University Library, Princeton, NJ: Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 
1994), microfilm reel 5, 33. 
52 Eisenhower, Princeton interview, 28. Unfortunately, no memos or records of these meetings were 
regularly kept, though Dulles or Eisenhower would occasionally mention in the diaries what was said. 
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executive as long as he was not currently occupied, though Adams did acknowledge that only 
Dulles regularly took Eisenhower up on the offer.53 This personal communication was aided by 
Eisenhower’s interpersonal skills. He was very approachable, helping inspire great loyalty in his 
staffers. George Kennan would note that, “Eisenhower was . . . charming and disarming . . . he 
was a very good talker,” who could, “put you off[guard] with his charm.”54 Dillon Anderson 
reported that Eisenhower was, “without trying to do so” an extremely charismatic person.55 He 
placed a great deal of trust in his individual staff members to do their jobs. The only frustrations 
that he reportedly had with major cabinet officials occurred when an official did not act with the 
independence he expected, notably in the case of the Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson. 
Arthur Radford, the Joint Chiefs Chairman, explained, “the president was annoyed with Mr. 
Wilson’s approach to some things . . . He would give you the impression he was beating around 
the bush. The President was used to men who made a very direct answer.” Adams observed that 
that, “Mr. Wilson . . . discombobulated the President by his detailed discussions about his 
Department [issues] . . . [That Eisenhower] thought he ought to have taken a stand on himself-
[and] not bothered him about it.”56 This structure that Eisenhower built up, mixing the formal 
and the informal, was in its early days in January of 1954. At this time, the crisis at Dien Bien 




53 Sherman Adams, interview with Richard D. Challenger (Lincoln, NH, 15 August 1964), in John Foster 
Dulles Oral History Project (Princeton University Library, Princeton, NJ: Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1994), 
microfilm reel 1, 5 
54 George Kennan, “Oral History with George F. Keenan.” Interview by Louis Fischer (23 March, 1965) 
from the John F. Kennedy Library; reprint in T. Christopher Jespersen, ed., Interviews with George Keenan 
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2002), 99. 
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In January of 1954, France had been fighting for over eight years in Indochina, having 
reentered the nation following World War II in late October of 1945. The French fought the 
communist Vietminh. By 1950, President Truman and his policy advisors agreed that Indochina 
was the key to holding Southeast Asia. From 1950-52, the U.S. spent fifty million dollars in aid 
to the French, and in the fiscal year of 1953, one third of France’s war costs were paid for by the 
United States.57 Relations were strained as the United States demanded that the French 
decolonize. The French insisted that Indochina at least be kept in the French Union, and they 
kept delaying independence for the Associated States of Indochina, Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia. The military support to the French continued under Eisenhower, and in mid-1953, 
Henri Navarre was appointed to the command of French forces in Vietnam. His plan was to 
enlist broader support among the indigenous population while marshalling French forces for a 
1955 assault.58 On November 20, 1953, Navarre launched Operation Castor and took control of 
the air strip of an administrative area called Dien Bien Phu, located in a valley in northern 
Vietnam.59  
Meanwhile, Eisenhower had put together a group to adjust U.S. Security Policy. Called 
the Solarium Project, its members produced what would be known as NSC 162/2, a plan which 
became known as the New Look. It reduced conventional forces in favor of massive retaliatory 
capabilities. NSC 162/2 would contain an interesting note on Indochina: “certain other countries, 
such as Indo-China . . . are of such strategic importance to the United States that an attack on 
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them probably would compel the United States to react with military force either locally at the 
point of attack or generally against the military power of the aggressor.”60 There were U.S. 
advisors in Indochina at this time. Lt. General John W. O’Daniel and his staff had returned to 
Vietnam after a visit the previous summer. His conclusion, reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
was that “real military progress in implementation of the ‘Navarre Plan’ is evident . . . prospects 
for victory appear increasingly encouraging.61” Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, declared in an address given December 2, 1953 that there was hope for victory in 
Indochina.62 Not all readers were happy with O’Daniel’s report. Army Chief of Staff Matthew 
Ridgway, while not concerned about Dien Bien Phu at the time, found O’Daniel to be overly-
optimistic.63 Eisenhower himself was disgusted with the situation at Dien Bien Phu. “As a 
soldier,” he would explain, “I was horror stricken. I just said, ‘my goodness, you don’t pen 
troops in a fortress, and all history shows that they are just going to be cut to pieces.’”64 By 
January of 1954, the French were in Dien Bien Phu, their opponents, the Vietminh, around them, 
and the United States had invested a substantial amount of money to save the “key” in Southeast 
Asia.  
 Early in January, the 179th meeting of the National Security Council was held, which 
discussed a policy paper prepared on Indochina, NSC 177 and its Special Annex, which 
concerned intervention possibilities. At the time, the military situation remained steady. The 
French were only “somewhat disturbed” about Dien Bien Phu. Allen Dulles, director of the CIA, 
put forth the proposition that the loss of Dien Bien Phu would not be a large military victory for 
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the Vietminh, but a political one.65 Richard Nixon’s contribution to the meeting were mainly 
political, as he warned that the French intended to keep the Vietnamese in the French Union, 
while the Vietnamese desired independence, noting that, “the essence of the problem is 
political.”66 Radford established his position early, warning that all that could be done to prevent 
defeat at Dien Bien Phu should be done, noting that as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet 
he had drawn up plans to aid the French with air power.67 When talk began drifting over to 
combat operations, Cutler broke in with the note that nothing in NSC 177 addressed combat 
unless the Chinese became involved.  
The meeting demonstrated three significant characteristics of the NSC. First, Cutler 
steered the conversation to specifically refer to papers discussed, and not expand beyond them. 
Eisenhower, however, desired to continue discussion. He floated the idea of giving the French a 
group of airmen without U.S. insignia. This shows both how the formal structure of the NSC 
could focus on a particular subject while Eisenhower could work beyond that structure on a point 
he felt particularly important.68 A second characteristic revealed in the 179th meeting was 
Eisenhower’s active contribution. While he would later discuss airmen, he first stated that, in 
regards to intervention with ground troops, “I can not tell you . . . how bitterly opposed I am to 
such a course of action. This war in Indochina would absorb our troops by divisions!”69 In 
making this statement after preliminary remarks by Radford, Eisenhower demonstrated what 
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Greenstein and Burke call his, “persistent impulse to think in terms of consequences.”70 Finally, 
the meeting demonstrated the long-term process of the Council, as no decisions were ultimately 
reached on NSC-177. The Special Annex, considered very sensitive, was ordered destroyed.71 
The next week, discussion continued in regards to the French in Indochina and Dien Bien 
Phu. In discussing NSC-177, the council discussed its language; Dulles objected to a point in the 
paper positing that the loss of Indochina would severely damage France’s world position. He 
stressed that the NSC should only be concerned with the U.S world position. Cutler agreed to 
make the change, and NSC 177 became NSC 5405 and was officially promulgated to the OCB.72 
The planning paper opened with a clear premise: “communist domination, by whatever means, 
of all of Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the 
long term, United States security interests,” noting that the primary threat came from internal 
subversion.73 It called for aggressive military, political, and psychological operations to be 
carried out against the Vietminh, and for the further development of indigenous armed forces 
that would eventually be capable of maintaining internal security.74 It also suggested 
“reiterating” to the French that, “in the absence of marked improvement in the military situation 
there is no basis for negotiation with any prospect for acceptable terms.”75 This referred to fears 
the France would accept a cease-fire. In the event of Chinese intervention, the paper suggested 
use of naval and air forces, with land forces to be considered when a crisis occurred, providing 
an official NSC view on action for Indochina.76 The paper was not, however, without some 
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problems. NSC 5405 had not made provisions for the possibility of the French and Indochinese 
forces failing to provide infantry. It advised unilateral action against targets in China if China 
intervened, but had no recommendations or options in terms of the ground conflict in which the 
United States might need to engage. 
NSC 5405 included advice to continue attempts to encourage the French to follow U.S. 
advice, while the French asked for more supplies. The U.S. position, despite its supplier-status, 
was weak, “because of the overriding importance given by Washington to holding the 
Communist line in Indochina, the French, in being able to threaten to withdraw, possessed an 
important instrument of blackmail.”77 As long as the United States saw both a vital need to hold 
Indochina and a need to keep U.S. troops out of that area, the  French could ask for a great deal 
of material aid. While mulling over the situation, Eisenhower on January 18 privately met with a 
group of men who would become his special committee for Indochina. He had been unhappy 
with the Planning Board’s effort, for to him it lacked clear action and alternatives.78 The creation 
of ad hoc groups for a specific topic was a means Eisenhower had used before, such as when the 
New Look was formulated. Cutler, after Eisenhower left office, explained that ad hoc groups 
were valuable “for the introduction of fresh ideas and points of view other than those generated 
within the government.”79 The group selected (Radford, Allen Dulles, Undersecretary of State 
Walter Bedell Smith, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roger Keyes, and C.D. Jackson, a White 
House advisor) was able to meet outside the NSC apparatus to bring in fresh ideas. They met 
first to discuss strategy and the additional aid the French requested: twenty-two B-26 bombers 
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and 400 airmen.80 When Keyes questioned if mechanics would be tantamount to ground forces, 
Smith and Radford agreed that it would not be. Both affirmed that they did not support ground 
forces. Radford felt only air intervention would be needed.81 
The Indochina Committee recommended to the president that twenty-two B-26s be given, 
along with 200 U.S. Air Mechanics through the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). 
Part of their instructions was that they did not have to use the OCB to carry out their 
recommendations,82 which amounted to telling them not to use the OCB. The OCB as this point, 
was, after all, relatively new, only having been formed in September and not yet incorporated in 
the NSC structure. Radford’s recommendations were made despite his lack of faith in the French. 
He would later explain that, “most of [The French Commanders] . . . did not impress me. . . . I 
had no confidence in French military planning or military execution.”83 While that statement was 
made years after Dien Bien Phu, Radford was worried early on about a French defeat, indicating 
at least a partial worry about French reliability. Yet, large amounts of aid continued to flow into 
Indochina. Eisenhower agreed with the recommendations, with the only changes being that the 
200 MAAG mechanics be rotated out by June 15, 1954 at the latest.84 This committee 
encapsulated Eisenhower’s ability to supplement the National Security Council if he felt it had 
not given him the number of options he wanted. The Special Committee grappled directly with 
keeping the French in Vietnam and strengthening them. When dissatisfied with his machinery, 
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he “expanded the advisory process by ordering the creation of a new means of study and 
deliberation.”85 
The situation at Dien Bien Phu itself remained fairly stable going into February. John 
Foster Dulles was preparing to go to Berlin to take part in a conference that would, among other 
things, determine if Indochina would be on the agenda for the Geneva Conference scheduled to 
begin at the end of April. Discussion in February focused on Indochina as a whole, and ways to 
increase the growth of indigenous forces. Eisenhower noted that a religious issue could unite 
people, with a Buddhist leader providing an anti-communist rallying point.86 Discussion 
continued, with Nixon noting the Bao Dai, the emperor of Vietnam, did not fit the bill for an 
inspirational leader. Dulles noted that there were 1.5 million Roman Catholics in Vietnam who 
might be enlisted in the struggle. In the end, it was decided that more, and hopefully better, 
officers of the United States Information Service be sent to Vietnam.87 Eisenhower was, in the 
context of discussion in the NSC, more than willing to suggest new and unconventional ideas in 
the Council, ideas which often did not lead to a specific action. Nixon noted that, “[Eisenhower] 
could be very enthusiastic about half-baked ideas in the discussion stage, but when it came to 
making a final decision, he was the coldest, most unemotional man in the world.”88 While still 
keeping in mind the spiritual side of the conflict, noting in a later meeting that, “the mood of 
discouragement [in Vietnam] came from the evident lack of a spiritual force among the French 
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and the Vietnamese, Eisenhower kept his decisions realistic, sending more propaganda officers 
rather than trying to start a spiritual revolution.89 
In February, the main focus of the Eisenhower administration in foreign affairs was not 
chiefly Indochina, but rather Berlin. The administration was worried that the conference would 
put Indochina on the agenda, and was also concerned any attempt to prevent placing Indochina 
on the agenda would result in a French backlash which would threaten the proposed European 
Defense Community Treaty; the U.S. greatly desired support for this treaty. After having 
invested so much into Indochina, the U.S felt betrayed when Indochina was placed on the 
agenda.90 With a developing situation depending upon adaptable diplomacy, Eisenhower 
coordinated with John Foster Dulles abroad. Dulles warned that Indochina was interwoven with 
the EDC. He opined that, “this political exertion on our part against [the] conference carries 
moral obligation to continue to sustain military effort,” because if the talks were not held and the 
U.S. did not provide aid, the negative effect on Franco-American relations would sink the 
EDC.91 Upon returning from Europe and reporting to the NSC, Dulles explained that the French 
would not press hard at the Conference Table unless there was a “substantial military disaster.”92 
The Special Committee for Indochina made another report at the beginning of March., 
which urged the continued strengthening of indigenous forces, the recruitment of aid from 
foreign countries, the strengthening the French Foreign Legion, the augmentation of the MAAG, 
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and psychological warfare operations. If that plan failed, the committee recommended 
considering direct military intervention.93 While Eisenhower would have been considering this 
advice, the NSC was also focused on Indochina, with Dien Bien Phu relatively secure. Harold 
Stassen, director of the Foreign Operations Administration, reported at the 187th NSC meeting 
that, after visiting Vietnam, he “had a strong feeling that the military situation was a great deal 
better than we had imagined,” and that the French position was so strong they hoped to be 
attacked.94 While not mentioning any reservations in the Council meeting, Eisenhower’s record 
with regards to Indochina action would suggest that he was not particularly optimistic. He had 
made his general position clear in January, with his warning that forces would be swallowed in 
the Vietnamese jungles. After his presidency, Eisenhower explained that he felt from the 
beginning that the French plan was “just silly.”95 To this point, the NSC had not played a 
decisive role in determining policy in regards to Indochina. Radford and the committee, along 
with Dulles in Europe, counseled Eisenhower independent of the Council. The situation had not 
been an emergency one yet, either. That would change, as on the afternoon of March 13, the 
assault on Dien Bien Phu finally began. 
Part III 
Initially, the role of the NSC remained limited. On March 18 it was reported that the 
situation at Dien Bien Phu was relatively steady, with intelligence estimates giving the French a 
50-50 chance of holding Dien Bien Phu. No action was ultimately decided, and the Planning 
Board was not tasked with drawing up any plans for the situation.96 The next meeting, however, 
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carried greater significance. The JCS had urged the council to examine the question of U.S. 
commitment in a report to the Council, which prompted Eisenhower to order Cutler to examine 
the situation with the Planning Board; Eisenhower stated explicitly that he wanted options 
including ground forces. Allen Dulles noted that the situation had improved for the French 
somewhat, though noting that the French could not support Dien Bien Phu because they did not 
control the roads in the surrounding countryside, or anywhere near the area. This led Eisenhower 
to comment, “if the point had been reached when the French forces could be moved only by air, 
it seemed sufficient indication that the population of Vietnam did not wish to be free from 
Communist domination.”97 However, he later observed that, “The collapse of Indochina would 
produce a chain reaction which would result in the fall of Southeast Asia to the communists,”98 
indicating his belief in the domino effect of one country’s fall to communism taking others with 
it. With these two frames of action in mind, the Planning Board was directed to look also at both 
unilateral and multilateral reaction. Another worry was the reaction of China to intervention. 
When Charles Wilson raised the question, Cutler turned the Council’s attention back to NSC 
5405, and its recommendation of U.S. strikes against China in the event of Chinese intervention. 
The NSC calm observance during the March 18th meeting had been replaced in the March 25th 
meeting with an actively probing group. The change between the two meetings had not been the 
result of any change in the battle at Dien Bien Phu, however. The Council was deeply affected in 
the time between the two meetings by the arrival of the French Chief of Staff, Paul Ely, who 
accented the graveness of the situation. 
Ely arrived in Washington in late March, and on the night of the 20th he dined at 
Radford’s home, along with General Jean Etienne Valluy, the head of the French Mission to the 
                                                            
97 Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 25, 
1954, ibid., 1164. 
98 Ibid., 1167-1168 
89
United States. Also present were Richard Nixon, Allen Dulles, Army Chief of Staff Matthew 
Ridgway, and Douglas MacArthur II. They discussed the situation at Dien Bien Phu, during 
which time Ely confessed that the loss of Dien Bien Phu, while not a military disaster, would 
wreck French morale. He indicated that the major French problem was lack of combat aircraft. 
Ely requested forty more B-26s, along with 800 G-12 Type parachutes to deliver supplies to the 
isolated fortress.99 Radford later expressed some frustration at the French desire for more 
parachutes, believing that the way the French employed them was part of a “terribly inefficient 
military operation.”100 The memo which was drawn up by Radford’s secretary reported that the 
meeting ended after a short discussion following the French request of supplies. One of the 
participants, however, recorded events slightly differently. General Ridgway drafted a memo in 
which, at the end of the meeting, Radford wanted to confirm with Ely that, “what you really need 
them for success is more air power.” Ridgway recorded that he responded immediately, stating, 
“the experience of Korea, where we had complete domination of the air and a far more powerful 
air force afforded no basis for thinking that some additional air power was going to bring 
decisive results on the ground.”101  
Lacking other accounts of the meeting, it is impossible to know with any certainty how 
the actual meeting ended. The fact that Radford’s secretary did not record this could simply 
indicate that it was considered immaterial. Whatever was actually said, the fact that Ridgway 
deemed it important enough to record indicates the early disagreement that would emerge among 
the Joint Chiefs and their Chairman. The incident also indicates that Radford desired intervention 
and that the French may have been aware of it. In a meeting of the Joint Chiefs on March 26, 
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Radford noted that Ely’s report had made him pessimistic and increased his urgency for 
intervention. In hindsight at least, he also realized it would not mean one quick strike, but a more 
committed U.S. position, explaining that, “we would have been in the war, and it would have 
been the beginning of a series of actions.”102  
Ely’s visit, in addition to strengthening Radford’s view that United States intervention 
was required to save the situation in Indochina, became the root of a misunderstanding that 
would deeply affect the situation. In later years, Radford was careful to note that there had been a 
miscommunication between him and Ely, one which he stressed was not his fault. “I had 
discussed with Ely, and I’m sure I told him that I thought we could do a certain thing. When I 
talked to him he understood, or should have understood - and I think he did - that this was a 
discussion of possibilities.103 Ely came out of their meetings with a surer feeling for U.S. aid. 
Some versions even have Radford offering the French the use of nuclear weapons as part of a 
conventional arsenal.104 Radford had in the past urged the use of atomic weapons against 
China.105 Radford himself denied recommending any specific action, but noted, “If we had used 
atomic weapons we probably would have been successful. We had atomic weapons we could 
have used.”106 MacArthur informed Dulles in April that Radford learned from a Pentagon study 
group that three tactical nuclear weapons could smash the Vietminh effort at Dien Bien Phu. 
Radford apparently wished to ask for French permission to use nuclear ordinance in Indochina if 
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the U.S. intervened. MacArthur judged this as very dangerous.107 The matter was dropped. In a 
March 22, Ely, Nixon, and Radford discussed the details of a possible operation, wherein 
hundreds of American aircraft would attack Vietminh positions. Ely later claimed that Radford 
was enthusiastic about the plan and, “intimated that he had Eisenhower’s support.”108 Radford 
claimed that he emphasized that there would need to be governmental approval. It is possible that 
neither man was being disingenuous; misunderstandings may have arisen due to language 
difficulties as they had no interpreter.109  Whatever the case, there was no agreement. The French 
were confidant, however, that if they asked, the Americans would respond favorably. They 
called the Operation Vatour (Vulture) and included it in their planning.110  
The rest of the Joint Chiefs, meanwhile, did not agree with Radford in regards to 
intervention and, in the case of Ridgway, the nature of the JCS apparatus itself. Some of the 
disagreement was relatively minor. For example, Radford suggested in a meeting with Ely that 
C-119 Cargo Planes be used to drop napalm on enemy positions.111 However, the Commander of 
the Far East Air Force (COMFEAF), recommended earlier that they not be used for that purpose, 
stating that “aircraft loaned to the French . . . are primarily for airlift purposes. The use of these 
same aircraft for combat purposes might well generate a requirement for additional aircraft 
which FEAF would like to avoid if possible.”112 Radford called the Chiefs together to ask 
whether they should recommend to the President and the NSC that the United States should 
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intervene through an airstrike. Radford himself recommended this action, but the rest of the Joint 
Chiefs did not.113 All sent back reactions that were essentially negative. The Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral Robert Carney, was the most ambiguous, stating that Indochina should be 
saved if possible, but he was not prepared to say the strike would be decisive. Nathan Twining, 
the Air Force Chief, gave his answer as a qualified “yes,” dependent on whether or not the 
French allowed for a U.S. command of Air Forces under a French Theater Commander, a greater 
role in training the indigenous forces for the U.S, and true Vietnamese sovereignty first. Given 
that Twining’s conditions were extremely unlikely to have been met, he was essentially a 
“no.”114 Lemuel Shepherd, commandant of the Marine Corps, was a clear “no,” stating that “Air 
intervention in the current fighting in Indochina would be an unprofitable adventure,” that would 
not turn the tide of the battle, nor would it contribute to French victory in Indochina elsewhere, 
nor would it deter communists. The United States would be in a situation where it would have to 
admit failure or use ground forces, both of which were, to Shepherd, unacceptable.115 Ridgway 
was the most strident “no.” He questioned whether it was even proper for Radford to put the 
question to them. The Joint Chiefs were, after all, not even supposed to comment on policy to the 
NSC until formal drafts went through the Planning Board. To go to the president preemptively to 
create policy was questionable. Ridgway noted that the issue “was clearly outside the proper 
scope of authority of the JCS. This body was neither charged with formulating foreign policy, 
nor of advocating it, unless its advice was specifically sought by the president, or the Secretary 
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of Defense. To do otherwise,” Ridgway warned, “would be to involve the JCS inevitably in 
politics.”116  
Possibly as a result of his regular interaction with the NCS, Radford had no difficulty 
recommending what he believed was an urgently needed course of action. He felt that Ridgway 
was a good field commander, but depended too much on his staff, later claiming that, “he wasn’t 
an independent thinker.”117 Ridgway, beyond his problems with the propriety of the request, was 
deeply opposed to a strike at Dien Bien Phu on military grounds. He made his feelings known in 
his memoranda. The disagreement would leave a strong enough impression on Ridgway that 
when he retired, his letter to Wilson clearly referenced Dien Bien Phu and Radford’s request for 
support in advising intervention. With regard to recommending action to the president and NSC 
when unsolicited, Ridgway said that “I have not been convinced that this is a proper role for a 
military leader.”118 He continued that, strategically speaking: 
I am opposed to the overemphasis of any military force where dependence on that force 
exceeds its capabilities. . . . The army has no wish to scrap its previous experience in favor of 
unproven doctrine, or in order to accommodate enthusiastic theorists having little or no 
responsibility for the consequences of following the  courses of action they advocate . . . Nothing 
currently available . . . reduces the  essentiality of mobile, powerful ground forces, the only 
forces which can seize the  enemies’ land and the  people living thereon, and exercise control 
over both.119 
 
The Joint Chiefs were not the only military men who made their views known. Other military 
officers expressed clear views against intervention. For example, Admiral A.C Davis, Director of 
the Office of Military Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, explained that, “The U.S 
                                                            
116 Memorandum by Chief of Staff, United States Army (Ridgway), 2 April 1954, ibid., 1220. 
117 Radford, Princeton interview, 25-27. 
118 Matthew Ridgway, Washington, D.C, to Charles Wilson, Washington, D.C, 27 June 1955, Matthew 
Ridgway Papers, box 16, p.8, Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA. 
119 Ibid., p. 10 
94
should not be self-duped into believing the possibility of partial involvement such as ‘naval and 
air units only.’ One cannot go over Niagara falls in a barrel only slightly. . . . It is difficult to 
understand how involvement of ground forces could be avoided.”120 Radford continued to 
advocate intervention.   
 Dulles was much more ambivalent about intervention, and less willing to express his 
opinion to foreign representatives than Radford was. He met with Radford and Ely in his office 
on March 23, the main topic of conversation was U.S. reaction to potential Chinese intervention. 
In his memorandum of the meeting for the President, Dulles proffered the view that “if the 
United States sent its flag and its own military establishment-land, sea, or air- into the Indochina 
war, then the prestige of the United States would be engaged to the point where we would want 
to have a success.”121 With such a complicated question, Dulles put off answering Ely until he 
could consult with the President, demonstrating a difference between him and Radford; 
Radford’s desire to intervene was apparently communicated to Ely.  
Dulles would also utilize NSC resources. The same day he met with Ely, he received a 
report from Robert Bowie on the extent of Chinese intervention, who were providing supplies of 
ammunition and cannon, and 2,000 Chinese soldiers manning artillery and anti-aircraft pieces.122 
Enclosed with Bowie’s letter was a letter from Charles Stelle, also of the Policy Planning Board, 
warning that if the Tonkin Delta fell, Communist forces would have a clear way into Southern 
Indochina and Thailand, warning that, “countries in the Far East, South Asia, and elsewhere in 
the world would be encouraged to adopt policies of accommodation to communist pressures and 
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objectives.”123 Dulles would use these materials in a speech for the Press Club, warning of the 
2,000 communist Chinese Bowie mentioned and the danger to the “entire Western Pacific area,” 
echoing Stelle’s sentiments.124 Dulles, like Eisenhower, was in the loop of the NSC. He 
discussed with Eisenhower the situation the day after receiving the reports from Bowie and 
Stelle. At this meeting between him and Dulles, Eisenhower expressed his own opinion on the 
situation. Dulles reported that 
The President said that he agreed basically that we should not get involved in fighting in 
Indochina unless there were political preconditions necessary for a successful outcome. He did 
not, however, wholly exclude the possibility of a single strike, if it were almost certain this 
would produce decisive results.125 
 
In consultation with Dulles, but after receiving NSC information, Eisenhower had decided that 
wholesale intervention would probably not go forward unilaterally. This was in keeping with his 
desire to avoid combat troops in the jungles of Vietnam. The NSC was used as it was supposed 
to be used: a tool for gathering options and information, along with consultation with men like 
Dulles. Nixon would note later that, in meetings with the NSC, the Cabinet, or congressional 
leaders, Eisenhower would “always go back to his office to reflect on what he had heard before 
deciding.”126  
During this time, the Planning Board demonstrated both its ability to react quickly in a 
crisis and its institutional memory. A Special Annex was prepared detailing contingencies for 
U.S. action. This was the Annex that had been prepared for NSC 177, and ordered destroyed. It 
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would appear that at least one copy was preserved, as it was quickly taken and readjusted for 
current circumstances. The first contingency covered the possibility that without U.S. aid, France 
would be forced to withdraw from Indochina. It said that if direct U.S. aid was judged to be 
meaningful, intervention would be further studied, but would focus on full independence for the 
Associated States, a continuing policy of arming indigenous forces, and seeking U.N. aid. The 
second contingency, if the United States offered to intervene but the French withdrew regardless 
of such an offer, meant that the United States could either accept the loss of Indochina or choose 
one of four options. Option A would be to urge the French to stage a coordinated withdrawal as 
the U.S. utilized ground forces, Option B called for using ground forces to only hold French hard 
points while training indigenous forces, Option C would be the use of naval and air power alone 
while training the indigenous forces, and Option D was to provide no direct support, only 
training. The Planning Board noted that these contingencies were valid under certain 
circumstances only: no renewal of the Korean War, no intervention by the Soviets or Chinese, 
and no expansion of the combat theater outside Indochina.127 It also warned that Option A, and 
to a lesser extent B, would force “major alterations in fiscal and budgetary programs . . . and 
reversal of policy planning to reduce the size of the U.S. Armed Forces.”
a 
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later, Eisenhower let the matter drop, but said that he wanted to meet with certain members of 
the NSC afterward. No official action was adopted other than further review.131 Radford and 
Dulles were to meet with Congress a few days after this meeting to brief them on the situation 
and request authority for unilateral aid if Eisenhower deemed it necessary. In a conversation with 
Eisenhower, Wilson, and Radford Eisenhower, Dulles told Eisenhower that he believed that 
Radford wanted Congressional approval to actually intervene, whereas he, Dulles, wanted to use 
the possibility of intervention as a deterrent.132 
 At a meeting with Congress to secure the ability to intervene, Dulles and Radford found 
that the feeling was unanimous among the senators that “we want no more Koreas with the 
United States furnishing 90% of the manpower.” He added that, while only air intervention was 
currently being considered, “once the flag was committed the use of land forces would inevitably 
follow.”133 Radford, when asked if a direct air attack would change the situation, said that it 
would have three weeks before, but not at the moment. This would have placed the best time for 
air intervention, according to Radford, about four days before Ely had even arrived in 
Washington.134 That same day, Bowie expressed to Dulles that the NSC needed to reach a 
decision as to whether or not intervention was even desired, and if so, how the U.S. would go 
about planning such intervention and securing Congressional support, and an invitation from 
France and the Associated States to intervene.135 Bowie’s comments represented part of the 
frustrations that the NSC was not as quick to respond as desired, though in fact the decisions 
regarding ground forces appear, from Eisenhower’s personal meetings and comments, to have 
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already been decided in the negative. A single air strike remained a possibility. Eisenhower 
apparently kept that decision to himself and Dulles, and continued to receive counsel as to 
intervention and kept that possibility publicly on the table.  
Eisenhower would soon have to face the consequences of that fact, as the French 
concluded that only Vulture could save the situation. Valluy had requested that the United States 
carry out Operation Vulture on April 4.136 Eisenhower was annoyed that Radford had told the 
French during Ely’s visit he would do his best to see that the U.S. carried out the operation. He 
told Dulles that, “[Radford] should never have told [a] foreign country he would do his best 
because they then start putting pressure on us.”137 As a man who prized his own counsel, 
Eisenhower clearly did not like the idea of one of his subordinates discussing their counsel 
outside the U.S. government. Radford  may have known Eisenhower’s displeasure, as he wrote 
to Dulles after the U.S. decided not to intervene that there was some kind of mix up and that he, 
“suspect[ed] the French of political machinations later to justify their actions,” possibly to deflect 
any condemnation of his own actions. 138 
 All these factors led to the April 6 meeting of the National Security Council, which was 
held earlier than usual, on a Tuesday, in view of the deteriorating situation in Indochina. This 
meeting proved the most important meeting regarding Dien Bien Phu. After the initial discussion 
of the situation, Cutler pointed out that the Planning Board paper promulgated March 29, in 
addition to spelling out contingency actions, noted that regardless of Dien Bien Phu, the contest 
in Indochina had yet to be decided. Wilson, Radford, and Allen Dulles all disagreed, feeling the 
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Planning Board report was too optimistic. Eisenhower expressed his belief that the fall of Dien 
Bien Phu could not be considered a military defeat, as the French had already inflicted 10,000 to 
20,000 casualties upon the Vietminh. He did not understand why the French did not send a relief 
column in force to the besieged area, echoing his continuing frustration with the French 
command performance. Following Congress’s recent reaction, Eisenhower pointed out that, 
“there was no possibility whatever of U.S. unilateral intervention in Indochina, and we had best 
face that fact.”139  
Dulles agreed that unilateral action support would be impossible. From the discussions 
emerged the desire to seek British involvement and prepare an organization similar to NATO in 
the region to prevent its total fall to Communism, a policy Dulles called “United Action.” While 
not directly stated, Eisenhower made it clear that unilateral intervention was unlikely:  
The President expressed his hostility to the notion that because we might lose Indochina 
we would necessarily lose all the rest of Southeast Asia . . . the President expressed warm 
approval for the idea of a political organization which would have for its purpose the defense of 
South-east Asia even if Indochina should be lost.140 
 
Though a deviation from the Domino theory, the argument justified the lack of U.S. commitment 
in the region Eisenhower desired.141 Stassen recommended a midway course between 
intervention and allowing Indochina to fall. He suggested establishing a South Vietnamese 
nation with a regional defense treaty built around it. Radford, still wholly supporting the Domino 
theory, objected that it would cause a negative chain reaction. The Secretary of the Treasury, 
George Humphrey, noted that if elections were held, South Vietnam could well go Communist, 
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though Eisenhower rebuked him, stating, “no free government had yet gone communist by its 
own choice.” Eisenhower concluded his discussion with Humphrey with the decision that, “we 
are not prepared now to take action with respect to Dien Bien Phu . . . but the coalition program 
for Southeast Asia must go forward as a matter of the greatest urgency.” Responding to Treasury 
Secretary George Humphrey’s concerns that the U.S. was embarking on a policy of trying to 
intervene wherever there were communist governments, Eisenhower explained that “in certain 
areas at least we cannot afford to let Moscow gain another bit of territory.” Eisenhower 
expressed his feeling that Indochina was not a place the U.S. should take action in at the 
moment, but noted that if a regional defense group went forward, “the battle is two-thirds 
won.”142  While agreeing that external and internal communist subversion was unacceptable, 
Nixon also pointed out that the U.S. had to avoid the political weight of appearing to be 
imperialists in the mold of the French and the British. The decision was reached to focus on 
creating an organization with the French, British, and local countries for regional defense. This 
was to be done in conjunction with an accelerated plan for Associated State independence.143   
 The April 6 meeting of the NSC was vital because it was there that Eisenhower made 
clear to the NSC his decision that the United States would not engage in unilateral intervention in 
Indochina, but rather would seek to create an alliance system in Southeast Asia to compensate 
for the possible fall of Indochina in the wake of Dien Bien Phu. Multilateral intervention 
remained a possibility, but only if the British were involved. This proposal offered several 
advantages. It required much less U.S. manpower on the ground. It would insure that if the U.S. 
intervened it would not appear colonialist. It might have rendered intervention unnecessary. 
Immerman and Herring note that, in policy considerations was the fact that, “the mere 
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establishment of such a coalition accompanied by stern warnings to the Communists might be 
sufficient to bolster the French will to resist,” though ultimately United Action would provide the 
best conditions for the U.S to intervene if necessary.144 This ultimate decision had resulted from 
both the NSC machinery and Eisenhower’s informal discussions. He had, in his talks with 
Dulles, established beforehand that he believed unilateral intervention would never be accepted. 
Even Dulles only wished to obtain its possibility as a threat. The Special Index of NSC 177/5405 
warned that intervention would play havoc with U.S. forces and their ability to act around the 
globe, a disruption Eisenhower was not prepared to cause if Indochina’s fall did not mean the fall 
of all of Southeast Asia. After all, if he had invested in unilateral intervention, the U.S. would 
have been forced to shift divisions to leave two more open and lack a strategic reserve, or the fill 
the extra divisions by recruitment or a draft.   
In the meeting, Eisenhower demonstrated his habit of introducing and discussing 
apparently unplanned ideas, like a regional defense pact, which gained traction and became U.S. 
policy. However, it would appear that Eisenhower had part of the United Action idea in mind, as 
prior to the meeting; Eisenhower had written Churchill to gather support for the French. He told 
Churchill that if Indochina fell, in his view, Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia would be hard “to 
keep out of Communist hands,” quite at odds with the conclusions Eisenhower had reached 
privately.145 He told Churchill that the best way to aid the French would be the establishment of 
an “ad hoc grouping or coalition composed of nations which have vital concern in the checking 
of Communist expansion in the area.”146  This correspondence revealed that Eisenhower was 
being discreet, both with the Council, in not telling them how far along his thinking was in 
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regards to action with allies, and to his allies, with whom he did not share his own conclusions. 
Despite this, the Council does not seem to have been irrelevant. Eisenhower actively engaged the 
Council members regarding policy and suggested that he was testing out his own thinking using 
the Council process. In the meeting he found support for his ideas and a chance to discuss them 
in greater detail.  
At this point, policy had been essentially decided, and further workings and re-workings 
would be of a more informal nature. As Greenstein and Burke explain,  
The shift to informal deliberation occurred because the problems confronting the 
administration in Southeast Asia in this period [following the April 6 meeting] were largely 
operational. The NSC as a policy planning body was not an appropriate instrument for 
supervising negotiations with Congress or allied nations.147 
 
After this meeting, Dulles and then Radford would depart for Europe to try and iron out the 
policy decided upon in the April 6th session. Dulles reported that the British were hesitant to act 
before Geneva as they were fearful of a ground war and did not believe Indochina’s fall would 
lead to the fall of all of Southeast Asia.148 This was, of course, also Eisenhower’s private view. 
Dulles remained Eisenhower’s chief personal advisor, while Radford was clearly still too 
interventionist for Eisenhower’s taste. 149 Dulles had departed for Europe on April 10, and would 
remain there for three weeks. He managed to secure from Eden an agreement to participate in a 
conference of powers before Geneva to discuss positions going into the talks. In Paris, his next 
destination, Dulles tried to convince the French to support United Action and not give in at 
Geneva. These plans were dropped, however, when the British pulled out of the conference of 
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allied powers before Geneva.150 The French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, would later 
claim that in his desperation for action, Dulles offered him the use of three atomic bombs. This is 
unsubstantiated by any other sources and seems quite unlikely given how far outside Dulles’ 
authority such an offer would have been; furthermore Dulles’ previous behavior does not hint 
that he would take such a step.151  
Meanwhile, Radford arrived in England, where he met with England’s Foreign Minister 
Anthony Eden and Ely. Ely stressed that Operation Vulture had to be carried out. Radford 
reported that, “[Ely] was surprised that I had not heard about [Operation Vulture] before. He 
went on further to say that this indicated a lack of close contact between the Americans and the 
military in Indochina which distressed him.”152 Ely had not caught the drift that only multilateral 
intervention was an option. After the British pulled out of the Pre-Geneva meeting, Radford 
recounted that “[Eisenhower] indicated that I had frightened the British by my hard words or 
something - I don’t know what they could have been. For my part I think Eden was a rather weak 
sister. He gave us the impression in Paris . . . that he was going to work with us.”153 Also during 
this time, possibly adding to English fear, was the fact that Richard Nixon had answered 
hypothetical press questions in regards to Indochina and mentioned that the U.S. might have to 
intervene, which disturbed both the American public and possibly the British.154 
It was eventually made clear to the U.S. representatives in England that the British would 
not support United Action. On April 23 and 24, Dulles continued to try and obtain Eden’s 
agreement with United Action while turning down another French request for U.S. air 
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intervention.155 At a dinner Radford had with Winston Churchill, Radford gained the impression 
that “Sir Winston was presently unprepared to participate in collective action.” This Radford 
reported at the next NSC meeting upon his return to the United States, April 29.156 According to 
Radford’s later accounts, Churchill made it clear that the United Kingdom would not help the 
French maintain their empire at the risk of nuclear war, after having lost so much of the British 
Empire already.157  Churchill had made his worries about the bomb known earlier, writing to 
Eisenhower in March, writing, “There is widespread anxiety here about the H-bomb.”158 
Radford, who had in the past expressed a desire to use nuclear weaponry in Indochina, suggested 
that his presence was perhaps not beneficial. Eden, for his part, was suspicious of U.S. motives. 
During the Geneva Conference, he commented that, “all the Americans want to do is to replace 
the French and run Indochina themselves. They want to replace us in Egypt too. They want to 
run the world.”159  
With the British out of the picture, the NSC briefly looked at unilateral intervention 
again. Stassen declared that some final decision reaching Indochina had to be reached, and he 
urged that the U.S. “go to the limits.” Stassen and Eisenhower then engaged in one of the most 
extensive back-and-forths on record concerning Indochina. Eisenhower expressed his doubt and 
argued that if the United States went in after the French, it would appear as though the U.S. were 
colonizers. Stassen argued that the United States had to act like a world leader. “Without allies 
and associates,” Eisenhower explained, “the leader is just an adventurer like Genghis Khan.”160 
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Stassen countered that the U.S. could depend upon Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand. 
Eisenhower expressed his belief that intervention in Indochina would result in a Chinese attack 
in Korea, and that investing in places like Vietnam would be “playing the enemy’s game-getting 
ourselves involved in brushfire wars in Burma, Afghanistan, and God knows where.”161 Stassen 
replied that brushfire wars in the future could be avoided by making it clear that general war 
would result from any Communist intrusion into any part of the world not currently under their 
control. For Stassen, the only war would then be in Indochina, where, as it already had 
communists in it, such a policy would be inapplicable. Eisenhower had already laid out his 
thinking on this subject outside the Council. On April 26 he had written to his friend (and 
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe) Al Gruenther, in which Eisenhower observed that the 
loss of Dien Bien Phu was not necessarily the end of the war in Indochina, and that a concert of 
nations in the area, such as NATO, would be best, as then, “we possibly wouldn’t have to 
fight.”162 With his thinking already laid out, Eisenhower was unlikely to change his mind unless 
he heard a convincing argument against those points. While Eisenhower listened to Stassen and 
allowed him to have his say, in the end he told the council that intervention with ground forces 
would not be deployed unilaterally, and that the United States policy without the British would 
be to continue to organize regional defense and await the return and report of Dulles on the 
diplomatic situation.163  
After the decisions of April 6 and April 29 in the Council, there was little to do but to 
wait for Dien Bien Phu to fall and try to minimize the damage. Cutler sent Smith a letter, 
discussing the general situation and the possible use of “new weapons,” i.e. nuclear weapons, but 
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nothing would ever come of it. 164 Dulles returned to the White House May 5 and, after 
discussing the situation at length, agreed that the “conditions [in Indochina] do not justify U.S 
entry into Indochina as a belligerent at this time.”165 At the next day’s NSC meeting, Dulles 
shared that assessment with the Council members. They agreed to accept a British proposal of 
organizing a five power staff agency consisting of the U.S., Britain, France, Australia, and New 
Zealand, to see to the defense of Southeast Asia. This would be supplementary to continued 
efforts to form a regional grouping. Allen Dulles’s intelligence report made it clear that Dien 
Bien Phu was in its death throes.166 The next day, Dien Bien Phu surrendered, after suffering 
immensely since the beginning of March. Thousands of French soldiers had perished, and 
thousands more would die in enemy captivity. The Vietminh had accepted staggering casualties 
to win their political victory. The next day, the NSC would focus on the defense of the Tonkin 
delta at the 196th NSC meeting, while also focusing on preserving the EDC, which would 
eventually fail, and convincing France into internationalizing the conflict.167 The next battle that 
was shaping up would be a diplomatic one at Geneva, where the State Department would take a 
lead on trying salvage the situation. Eisenhower ordered further study for Indochinese 
intervention, looking at economic warfare plans, U.N intervention, and independence for the 
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 In the first five weeks after Dien Bien Phu, intervention appeared on the surface to be an 
option, with Eisenhower and Dulles even going so far as to draft a Congressional resolution for 
intervention. However, as negotiations dragged on, a final agreement was reached in July of 
1954 which partitioned the country into North and South Vietnam, provided for the withdrawal 
of the French, and set elections for 1956 to reunify the country. While denounced at home for 
being a concession, it was in some ways pleasing to the Eisenhower administration. South 
Vietnam could be built into a bulwark against communism, while French colonialism would 
hopefully no longer be the troublesome issue that it had been.169 The Eisenhower administration 
found a leader in Ngo Dinh Diem, though its man on location, Joe Collins, reported that he 
doubted Diem’s capacity to lead the country. Nevertheless, Diem remained in power, and Collins 
focused on trying to address Vietnam’s modernization needs.170 Dillon Anderson, who became 
Eisenhower’s second Special Assistant for National Security in 1955, explained that the decision 
was made to insure stability. “[Eisenhower] was the one who made the decision to recognize and 
back Diem. . . . I knew how he felt about getting into a land war out there . . . he wasn’t going to 
do it there or anywhere else on the continent of Asia.”171 Anderson would leave his position after 
a year, but would be a member of a commission sent to evaluate the Mutual Aid programs the 
U.S. established in Southeast Asia, thereby fulfilling Cutler’s idea of having outside groups 
conduct the study of operations to provide fresh perspective. While suggesting some personal 
misgivings about economic aid, Dillon’s report on Vietnam was upbeat. South Vietnam was, “a 
nation acknowledged to be the Free World’s strong anchor on the Southeast Asia Mainland,” and 
that the process of equipping and training indigenous forces continued, and that aid would be 
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required for Vietnam to be fully independent.172 The United States was preparing to be in 
Vietnam as long as it needed to be in a supporting role. 
 During the crisis at Dien Bien Phu, Eisenhower’s National Security Council played an 
important part in Eisenhower deliberations, but was augmented by the ad hoc and informal 
means of advice that Eisenhower created or sought out. After the April 6th meeting of the NSC, 
unilateral intervention was taken off the table due a combination of factors. The Special Annex, 
with its warnings on the effect that committing ground forces would have on the U.S. defense 
posture reinforced Eisenhower’s own fears of ground troops in Vietnam being absorbed “by 
divisions.” His discussions with Dulles indicated that both men were at least wary of Indochina. 
By the time of the April 1 NSC meeting, Eisenhower knew when Radford urged air intervention 
that the rest of the Joint Chiefs were not in agreement. With unilateral intervention discarded, the 
focus turned to multilateral efforts.  After those failed to find support, there was no real attempt 
to organize unilateral intervention again except for Harold Stassen’s vehement arguments. It has 
been suggested that Eisenhower never intended for multilateral intervention to work, but he 
wanted the British to take the blame for non-intervention. Nixon noted in his memoirs that, 
“[Eisenhower] seemed resigned to doing nothing at all unless we could get allies . . . and he did 
not seem inclined to put much pressure on to get them to come along.”173 The British certainly 
felt that blame was being shifted onto them.174 Some Eisenhower revisionists, such as Melanie 
Billings-Yun, conclude that, “[Eisenhower] succeeded in laying the blame on America’s allies, 
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particularly Britain, for his decision not to intervene in Indochina prior to the Geneva 
conference.175  
 It appears that Dulles desired the option of multilateral intervention. His sister recounted 
that, after having thought he had worked out some negotiation with the British, Dulles claimed 
that “Eden had double-crossed me. He lied to me . . . about our intervening in Indochina,” once 
that option fell through.176 Like Dulles, Eisenhower may have wanted to retain the possibility of 
multilateral intervention, at least to stave off Indochina’s fall, ideally without any direct action. 
Eisenhower liked to have options, and if it came down to an emergency, he would have 
preferred, no doubt, to have the British-U.S. intervention as an option. As he made clear to 
Gruenther, Eisenhower thought the very possibility of multilateral intervention might prevent its 
necessity. He and Dulles, in their discussions, did seem personally frustrated with the French and 
the British lack of cooperation.177 Eisenhower’s openness to various possibilities, the continued 
efforts at international cooperation, his agreement to the five power staff for Indochina, and his 
rebuke of Radford for scaring the British off would indicate that he did want the option of 
intervention with the British. If not, than he was certainly keeping his cards close to his chest. As 
Greenstein and Burke note, however, Eisenhower’s innermost thoughts “are bound to be 
elusive.”178 
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 With the greater revisionism accompanying Eisenhower, his decision to avoid 
involvement in Vietnam has drawn much applause in light of later U.S. difficulties there. Some 
scholars, however, consider Eisenhower’s administration the father of the Vietnam War. 
Summarizing the latter view, Robert McMahon explains that,  
The Eisenhower administration grievously misunderstood and underestimated the most 
significant historical development of the mid-twentieth century-the Force of Third-World 
Nationalism. This failure of perception . . . constituted a major setback for American 
diplomacy.179 
 
George Herring clearly falls into a less appreciative camp, noting that in the case of South 
Vietnam, “had it looked all over the world, the United States could not have chosen a less likely 
place for an experiment in nation building.”180 Herring further argues that, “lacking an acute 
knowledge of Vietnamese culture and history . . . the Americans seriously underestimated the 
difficulties of nation-building in an area without any real basis for nationhood.”181 The 
Eisenhower administration entered the White House, “confident that new methods or the more 
persistent application of old ones could turn a deteriorating situation around.”182 When the 
United States allowed Diem to cancel the election to reunite Vietnam in 1956, the Eisenhower 
administration, according to Richard Immerman, “signaled that diplomacy- and international 
law- were not substitutes for force. Soon it would find itself trapped by its own logic in 
summoning that force.”183 Edward Cuddy argues that Eisenhower played, “arguably the most 
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crucial role of all presidents,” in U.S. involvement in Vietnam, arguing that SEATO was a “toxic 
blend of cold war ideology and distorted history.”184 
These scholars present strong cases, especially regarding the misunderstanding of third 
world nationalism. Eisenhower’s whole policy apparatus supported a continuation of arming 
indigenous forces and fostering Vietnamese nationalism, convinced that the strategy that had 
been tried since the Truman administration would succeed as long as it was done right, ignoring 
the reality that the nationalists were fighting for the Vietminh. Even recognizing that there was 
no strong, unifying figure as was found in Korea, Eisenhower hoped that a policy of what would 
be known as Vietnamization would succeed in preventing the necessity of direct U.S. 
intervention. However, even if he clearly misunderstood third world nationalism, he was 
resolutely anti-colonial. He and the whole NSC were frustrated by French Colonialism. 
Eisenhower did not want to engage in a war in Vietnam. While he tried to build an indigenous 
force, he never committed U.S. ground troops in actual combat that would tie the U.S. to 
Vietnam irrevocably and require outright victory. He had come to the conclusion in the National 
Security Council, based on the advice he received and his own observations that Indochina could 
fall without taking all of Southeast Asia with it. Dillon Anderson would note that  
Eisenhower never let one of those things [like Vietnam] get to the point where we had 
ourselves committed to an outright confrontation . . . he never let our national commitments get 
to a point where we couldn’t distance it. . . . He tempered our action with what we could do 
successfully.185 
 
Whether or not he created a situation in which future presidents could become entangled in the 
maw of Vietnam will be always be a debatable point.  Eisenhower, however, avoided committing 
                                                            
184 Edward Cuddy, “Vietnam: Mr. Johnson’s War, or Mr. Eisenhower’s?” The Review of Politics 66, no. 4 
(Autumn, 2003), 352. JSTOR. Accessed 6 December 2008. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1408716. 
185 Anderson,  Luter interview, 37. 
112
the U.S. to Vietnam and it seems unlikely that he would have deployed actual combat forces, due 
to his thoughts dating back to the beginning of the Indochinese crisis. 
 The example of Dien Bien Phu provides a look into the National Security Council in its 
early days. It was still finding its exact tone. Eisenhower was occasionally unhappy with the 
Planning Board. The OCB was not used in any meaningful way, and would not even be part of 
the NSC for another four years. It did not lead to immediately decisive solutions. Frequently 
during Dien Bien Phu, matters were tabled until the next session. Eisenhower in general was, 
“not characterized by the rapid, decisive decision-making style of less complex leaders like 
Truman and Lyndon Johnson.”186 Immerman and Herring argue that the NSC was of peripheral 
importance to the decisions at Dien Bien Phu and “lagged behind the unfolding events in 
Indochina.”187 Eisenhower, after all, made his important decisions outside the Council, such as 
reaching the determination that ground forces would not be needed and that the British would 
have to support any intervention. However, those decisions themselves were made in the context 
of informal advice, previous NSC meetings, and NSC policy papers spelling out his alternatives, 
such as the Special Annex warning of the effect intervention would have on America’s 
manpower reserves. Eisenhower was able to use what he needed from the NSC, and he set up 
other methods of gathering advice and information, either from ad hoc groups or his personal 
communications, when he felt he needed it. In particular, private meetings with Dulles had a 
great individual effect on policy.  
In the end, the NSC, despite some of its difficulties, would prove a vital forum in which 
Eisenhower would make decisions; even when ideas were already formulated, he tested them 
with the Council, not letting them know his own thoughts. His desire to have the meetings so 
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regularly in the first place and his continuation of those meetings indicated that he placed great 
value on the Council’s uncolored opinions. The Planning Board provided plans that were the 
basis of discussion both in and out of Council. It was ultimately a formal mechanism that 
Eisenhower used that could be allowed adaptability and did not restrict debate or information. It 
was also not a rule by committee. Eisenhower decided matters for himself, but did so after 
receiving the best advice he could from the relevant members of the Council. Even if he 
disagreed with a Council member, as was the case with Stassen, he engaged in vigorous debate, 
defended his position and listened carefully to others. The NSC was helpful in anticipating 
consequences and acting for the best benefit of the United States. Robert Cutler, testifying before 
the Jackson Subcommittee after Eisenhower left office, told the Congress, “to give a President a 
tool he can use for his own use is the reason why the National Security Act seems to me a major 
triumph of our national legislature.”188 For Cutler, it could be called a triumph because he felt 
that Eisenhower’s NSC had in its eight years contributed greatly to Eisenhower’s efforts to form 
intelligent national security policy to challenges like those posed in Vietnam. In the end, while 
heavily invested in Vietnam, before and after Dien Bien Phu, Eisenhower’s formal and informal 
channels of communication convinced him both that commitment to Dien Bien Phu would 
negatively impact the United States, and that Indochina was not an area which the U.S. 
absolutely had to defend to prevent Southeast Asia’s fall to communism. As such, he decided to 
avoid coming to a point in which the U.S. would be committed to war. While not perfect, and not 
the exclusive foundation of advice by any means, Dwight D. Eisenhower’s National Security 
Council played a vital role in providing well thought out policy for the United States during 
Eisenhower’s administration. 
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